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Abstract: In everyday language use, the content of an indexical sentence is determined by the 
parameters of the context in which it occurs. In fictional discourse, however, indexical 
sentences seem to behave in a nonstandard way. This paper attempts to show that the 






















1. Indexicals in fiction 
 
It is hard to imagine a contemporary debate about the semantic evaluation of indexical 
expressions without mentioning at least some of the main tenets of David Kaplan’s formal 
system Logic of Demonstratives (LD). Perhaps the most often mentioned element of LD is the 
clear conceptual distinction between context of use and circumstance of evaluation.  
Contexts of use are conceived of as minimal collections of parameters which are needed to 
determine the semantic contents of indexical expressions. Such collections could be 
represented by quintuples of the form <a, t, l, w, g>, where a is an agent, t is a point of time, l 
is a location, w is a possible state of the world, and g is a (possibly partial) variable 
assignment function defined on the salient entities of w at t and l. According to this 
conception, the content of the formal counterpart of ʻI’ in context c at w is ca, the agent of c.
1
 
The content of ʻhere’ in c at w is cl, the location of c. In other cases, for example ʻnow’ and 
ʻtoday’, the evaluation proceeds in a similar way. 
Circumstances of evaluation are identified in LD with world-time pairs <w, t>, but if the 
complexity of the evaluated formal material requires this, they may also include further 
parameters. The number and kind of additional parameters do not influence substantially the 
role of circumstances. That role consists in assigning truth values to the content of sentences 
which contain one or more indexical expressions. 
Kaplan’s specific point in introducing the distinction between context and circumstance 
was to correct a serious mistake of earlier theories of indexical languages.
2
 Earlier index 
theory applied a model in which the semantic values of sentences were computed by a one-
step method. In that model, an indexical sentence A were interpreted with respect to its 
context of use c and the world w of that very context. But, as Kaplan pointed out, in some 
very simple cases of modal reasoning, the one-step method yields intuitively wrong results 
concerning validity and logical truth. Consider the following pair of sentences: 
 
(1) I am here now. 
 
(2) The author of this essay is here now. 
 
                                                 
1
 From here on the reference to the assignment function g will be omitted for the sake of 
simplicity. 
2
 See Kaplan 1989: 509–10; Perry & Israel 1996. 
According to the one-step method, in cases where the agent of (1) is not at cl and ct at the 
world of c, (1) expresses a false proposition. This suggests that (1) has the same status with 
respect to truth and falsity as (2): if we alter the world parameter in an appropriate way, both 
sentences may come out as false. The parallelism may strike many as problematic, since (1) 
seems to express a logically true proposition, while what is expressed by (2) is a clear 
example of a contingent proposition.  
A further problem is that the one-step method allows for modal generalizations. It says that 
if A is a logical truth, then Necessarily, A should also be regarded as logically true. But even if 
the logical truth of (1) would be admitted by one-step theorists, the validity of the 
generalization from (1) to (3) would remain doubtful: 
 
(1) I am here now. Therefore 
 
(3) Necessarily, I am here now. 
 
Though the embedded sentence in the scope of the modal operator may be said to be logically 
true, (3) expresses a false proposition. Obviously enough, the agent of the sentence might be 
located at another place at the time of the utterance of (3). 
Kaplan ended his analysis of these merely technical examples with a twofold conclusion. 
First, in order to save our intuition that (1) expresses a logically true proposition, the notion of 
context in LD must be restricted to proper contexts. A context c qualifies as proper context 
only if ca is at cl and ct at the world of c. Proper contexts are not allowed to include 
counterfactual world parameters, this is exactly the reason why I am here now cannot express 
a falsehood in them. Second, it is also a reasonable requirement that (3) and kindred sentences 
be evaluated as false in LD. This requirement is easily met when (3) is evaluated at improper 
world-time pairs. If Necessarily, I am here now is evaluated with respect to a world, where 
the agent is not located at the place of the context of the uttered sentence, the expressed 
proposition becomes false. 
These innovations renewed the standard evaluative procedures of index-based theories. 
Kaplan introduced into LD what we may call a two-step method. In this method, as a first 
step, indexical sentences are evaluated with respect to their content in proper contexts, then, 
as a second step, sentence contents are evaluated with respect to truth values in proper or 
improper world-time pairs. 
Most philosophers and semanticists agree today that the separation of these steps on the 
basis of a clear distinction between the semantic role of context and circumstance was a great 
achievement. In spite of the agreement, some parts of LD were heavily criticized from very 
early on. Studies carried out in the nineties have attempted to prove, for example, that 
Kaplan’s insights cannot be applied consistently to specific discourse situations.3 In 
particular, answerphone messages and written notes were claimed to provide counterexamples 
to the Kaplanian thesis that the sentence I am here now cannot have true instances in improper 
contexts. Nowadays, this branch of the debate focuses primarily on the theoretical legitimacy 
of the proper/improper conceptual distinction. Some are of the opinion that restricting LD to 
proper contexts is nothing else than an ad hoc solution to the problem of logical truth in 
indexical languages.
4
 Others maintain that the Kaplanian picture is correct in most of its 




This is an interesting debate in its own right, but I think we can deepen our understanding 
of Kaplan’s original motives, if we slightly change our point of view. A common feature of   
answerphone messages, written notes and similar examples is that in such situations the 
content of one or more indexical expressions is determined by a nonstandard parameter. In the 
framework of LD, operator controlled parameter shift is considered as impossible, but Kaplan 
does not take into consideration cases of free parameter-shifting.
6
 So, the question arises 
whether LD is able to account for cases of language use where contextual parameters are 
shifted freely. In a sense, this is a different question from that of the legitimacy of the 
proper/improper distinction. Improper contexts resemble logically impossible worlds, thus 
Kaplan can persuasively argue against their semantic usefulness. In contrast, the existence of 
shifted contexts cannot be excluded on purely logical grounds. At least, it is easy to find “raw 
data” which seem to demonstrate the reality of their everyday existence.7 
                                                 
3
 As far as I know, the debate was opened by Sidelle 1991. 
4
 See, for example, Predelli 2005. 
5
 Stevens 2009 and Vecsey 2010. 
6
 Kaplan illustrates the impossibility of operator controlled parameter shift with the following 
example: (#) In some contexts it is true that I am tired now. Indeed, if the operator In some 
contexts it is true that would operate on the meaning of ʻI’, then (#) would be true when in 
some context an agent were tired at the time of that context. However, the proposition 
expressed by the embedded sentence has nothing to do with such an agent: as usual, the agent 
of the embedded sentence is the agent of the context of (#). 
7
 As regards the role of data in linguistics in general, see Kertész & Rákosi 2012. 
Fictional discourses provide perhaps the most straightforward instances of free parameter-
shift. Let us take the case of an actor playing Hamlet. Consider the following utterance from 
Act III, Scene ii: 
 
(4) I must be idle. 
 
For the purposes of a formal analysis, one must, of course, disregard the contingent properties 
of an uttered sentence such as (4). What is interesting is instead the content-determining 
relation that holds between an abstract sequence of contextual parameters and the occurrence 
of the sentence type I must be idle in a context with that sequence. In this regard, it is 
important to realize that in the context of (4) the content of the first person pronoun is not 
determined by the agent of that context. If the context of the play, c, is depicted by <a, t, l, 
w>, then the agent of c should not be identified with ca. That means, in other words, that the 
actor of the play should not be conceived as asserting a proposition according to which he 
himself must be idle. In order to arrive at an intuitively correct result, the agent parameter 
must then somehow be shifted from ca to ca*, so that the content of ʻI’ be determined by the 
relevant agent parameter of the play, ca*, that is, by Hamlet.
8 
The example may be generalized to many other cases of first-person sentences occuring in 
written or spoken fictional discourse. All these cases involve a nonstandard agent parameter 
which has to take over the content-determining role of the default agent parameter. For those 
who accept the relevance of fictional discourse to the Kaplanian semantics, the main 
explanatory task is then to find a general rule or principle which is able to explain the 
underlying mechanism of parameter-shifting. 
 
2. Two solutions to the problem of parameter shift 
 
Eros Corazza and Mark Whitsey have recently offered a sophisticated explanation of 
parameter-shifting which is deliberately conservative with respect to LD.
9
 According to the 
                                                 
8 One might object here that a shift of this sort cannot occur, because Hamlet denotes an 
abstract, fictional, or merely possible etc. object, and it would be fundamentally mistaken to 
represent such an object as an agent. I find this objection unpersuasive. It would be fatal for 
our semantic theorizing, if formal rules for indexical sentences were dependent on the 
ontological status of fictional characters. From a formal point of view, the proper name 
Hamlet denotes always an agent, no matter what kind of object is taken as its content. 
9
 Corazza & Whitsey 2003. 
view proposed by Corazza and Whitsey, indexical expressions behave in fictional discourses 
in accordance with the Kaplanian principles. Indexicals are directly referring singular terms, 
and as such they are immediately connected to the appropriate parameters of their actual 
context of use. One key difference is that in fictional discourses the content of indexicals is 
determined by empty parameters. Let us return for a moment to our earlier example from 
Hamlet, Act III, Scene ii: 
 
(4) I must be idle. 
 
Corazza and Whitsey would say that the actor playing Hamlet is not a likely candidate as a  
content-determining parameter for ʻI’ in (4), and thus an alternative parameter must be found. 
Obviously, the alternative parameter can only be Hamlet himself. On the basis of their anti-
realist convictions, Corazza and Whitsey would also say that because Hamlet does not exist, 
the fictional name Hamlet should be regarded as an empty term. 
Two consequences follow from the above remarks. Firstly, the first person pronoun ʻI’ in 
(4) acquires its content from a shifted agent parameter. This seems to be a superficial but 
correct observation. Secondly, the shifted parameter is an empty one, which induces a context 
block. In connection with this latter term, Corazza and Whitsey allude to a general feature of 
fictional discourses. They suggest, following Kendall Walton, that fictional contexts 
containing empty parameters are part of a language game that can be characterized by the 
mental act of pretending. Participiants of a fictional discourse pretend that in a blocked 
context indexical expressions behave in complete accordance with the conditions of their 
standard use. In uttering (4), for example, the actor pretends to be Hamlet, and the audience of 
the play participates in the pretence. Though the context is blocked because of the presence of 
an empty parameter, the first person pronoun ʻI’ is pretended to denote Hamlet.10 
It deserves mentioning that Corazza and Whitsey are aware of a potential problem which 
may arise from the postulation of empty parameters. Let us suppose that (1) occurs in a 
fictional context: 
 
(1) I am here now. 
 
                                                 
10
 Jonathan Gorvett has recently proposed a very similar theory. See Gorvett 2005. 
According to the view under discussion, the content of ʻI’, ʻhere’, and ʻnow’ must be 
evaluated in (1) with respect to an empty contextual parameter. More precisely, all three 
expressions are supposed to be connected to the one and the same empty parameter, and that 
is controversial. How can the content of different type of indexicals be determined by the 
same parameter? Corazza and Whitsey offer a solution to this problem by claiming that in 
fictional discourses indexicals contribute to the propositional content of sentences with more 
than the objects they denote. Their meanings are accompanied with a specific kind of 
information which could make their use cognitively significant. On this account, the cognitive 
significance of (1) can be traced back to the fact that the proposition expressed by it contains 
some piece of information about an agent, a location and a point of time. Such informations 
are sometimes identified with reflexive truth conditions.
11
 In the case of (1), the satisfaction of 
these truth conditions requires merely that one understand the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence. At the level of reflexive truth conditions, (1) expresses (a), (b), and (c): 
 
(a) There is an agent a of (1); 
(b) a is located at the place of the context of (1); 
(c) a is located at the time of the context of (1). 
 
The distinctive feature of this reflexive content is that it is free from existential commitment.  
It may be said, then, that (a), (b), and (c) captures fully the cognitive significance of the 
sentence I am here now, despite the fact that ʻI’, ʻhere’, and ʻnow’ are determined by an 
empty parameter. 
I think the expanation for parameter shift given by Corazza and Whitsey is very far from 
being conservative with respect to the Kaplanian semantics. Indexicals denote their objects 
directly in LD. As Kaplan has often stressed, these expressions contribute to the content of 
sentences in which they occur without the mediation of any other propositional component.
12
 
So the claim that indexicals are endowed with a certain kind of surplus semantic information 
seems wholly incompatible with Kaplan’s original insight. This is, hovewer, only the first 
controversial aspect of the proposal. The second difficulty is that even if it were accepted that 
reflexive truth conditions have to be involved in the evaluation of indexical sentences, the 
proposal would not be able to say anything about the underlying principles of parameter-
shifting. Corazza and Whitsey maintain that parameter shift is an inherent feature of fictional 
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 See Perry 2001. 
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 See, for example, Kaplan 1989: 492–95, 520 & 568. 
discourses, and as such requires no further explanation.
13
 Quite the contrary. If nothing else, 
Corazza and Whitsey would have to provide an account of why fictional discourses have this 
special feature. 
In an interesting paper, Stefano Predelli attempted to give a quite different approach to the 
phenomenon of parameter-shifting.
14
 Predelli’s overall account of indexicality is more closely 
related to LD than that of Corazza and Whitsey’s. In particular, Predelli follows Kaplan’s 
advice in that he applies the two-step method for the evaluation of indexical sentences. He 
agrees with Kaplan that propositional contents are determined on the basis of ordered pairs 
consisting of sentence types and contexts. He also adopts the Kaplanian thesis that truth 
values for propositions are calculated under different circumstances of evaluation. However, 
Predelli sees LD as an inappropriate framework for semantic theorizing when it comes to the 
analysis of paradigmatic examples of fictional discourse. Undoubtedly, LD yields a wrong 
result with respect to the evaluation of such a sentence as (5) from Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii: 
 
(5) Denmark’s a prison. 
 
Predelli thinks the resources of LD as inadequate in this case, because (5) does not express the 
opinion of the actor who plays the role of Hamlet. A modification is required, so that (5) be 
evaluated with respect to the characters and the world of the story of the play. As we have 
seen, Corazza and Whitsey would claim that, as a part of the language game of fiction, the 
sentence Denmark’s a prison is only pretended to be true in the mouth of the actor. Predelli 
proposes to consider a structurally similar conception. Let us suppose that fictional sentences 
are suitable for formal analysis only if they are supplied with a prefix in the following form:
15 
 
(5’) It is true in the play of Hamlet that Denmark’s a prison. 
 
The essence of this conception is that the prefix in (5’) works as an intensional operator and 
thus shifts the world and time parameter of the embedded sentence. This manoeuvre fits well 
with the methodology of LD. Kaplan remarked that intensional operators may operate on the 
parameters of the circumstance of evaluation, since not all features of worlds and times are 
build in into the content of sentences. Points of times, for example, may be shifted by 
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 Corazza & Whitsey 2003: 131. 
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 Predelli 1997. 
15
 The idea for this arises from Lewis 1978. 
operators, because indexical sentences left the relation between the time of their content and 
the truth of their content often unmarked. In the cases of fictional sentences, however, there is 
a significant difference. Why should one think that the sentence type (5’) may function as a 
formal counterpart of the sentence type (5)? The syntactic structure of (5) has nothing in 
common with the syntactic structure of (5’), and it is fairly unlikely that such a difference 
would not imply a corresponding difference in the semantic content of these sentences. 
Moreover, the presence of the truth predicate gives to (5’) a metatheoretic flavor which is 
wholly absent in the other case. Predelli rightly complains that the sole motivation for 
attaching intensional operators to sentences like (5) seems to be to arrive at an intuitively 
correct semantic picture of fictional discourse. 
    Because of its ad hoc character, Predelli rejects the prefixing proposal as inadequate. In his 
view, the right solution to the problem arising from the phenomenon of parameter-shifting 
requires a less radical modification of LD. The point is that in the course of the evaluation 
process the original syntactic properties of fictional sentences should be kept fixed. Hence, 
such sentence types as I must be idle or Denmark’s a prison have to be taken as appropriate 
objects for formal analysis. But, as Predelli points out, it is also important to recognize the 
explanatory limits of LD. According to the Kaplanian semantics, each context of use is 
associated with a privileged world. In normal cases of language use, contexts are usually 
associated with the actual world.
16 
Consider again (4): 
 
(4) I must be idle. 
 
The privileged world of (4) seems to be the world of the performance of the play, since hat is 
the world in which the actor plays the role of Hamlet. But this cannot be correct. Predelli 
seeks a way out this semantic impasse in saying that the evaluation of (4) involves a new 
context, and the new context contains a shifted world parameter. The new context contains 
just this one shifted parameter, therefore the content of the proposition expressed by I must be 
idle remains intact. In turn, the shifted world parameter determines the world of the play as 
the circumstance of evaluation. So while LD selects the actual world as privileged for (4), 
Predelli thinks the world of Hamlet as privileged for (4). 
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 This remark is true, of course, only with respect of non-modal contexts. 
Unfortunately, Predelli’s explanation remains essentially incomplete, because it is unable 
to shed light on the rules governing the mechanism of parameter shift.
17
 It is not clear at all 
what sets off the process of parameter-shifting, and nothing is said about the semantic rules 
underlying this process. 
 
3. Perspectival indexicality 
 
Both views outlined above include a mysterious element. Parameter-shifting is recognized as 
a real semantic phenomenon, but no clear explication is given for its origin. In this last 
section, I want to sketch an account which may be hoped to be somewhat less mysterious.  
It has been occasionally stated in the relevant literature that indexicals are perspectival 
expressions. Kaplan remarked, for example, that the content of indexical sentences is always 
dependent on the speaker’s perspective.18 Predelli also observed that when one talks about 
fictional characters or events, one talks, roughly speaking, from the perspective of the story.
19 
I think the notion of perspective may also help to understand better the nature of fictional 
discourse. For present purposes, very little turns on the details of the definition of this notiton. 
Perspective can be taken to mean, roughly, that our epistemic access to the world around us is 
limited in various ways. Everyone possesses a diverse set of concepts with a corresponding 
set of cognitive abilities. Hence the great variability in possible responses to a particular 
epistemic situation. Nonetheless, understanding some features of the world seems often to be 
connected to a specific epistemic perspective. This is especially characteristic of fictional 
discourse: the role of truth in fiction cannot be understood fully from a purely factual 
perspective. This may be regarded as a reason for including the notion of perspective in the 
stock of semantic primitives of LD. The idea promoted here is that perspective, seen as a 
primitive, can serve the function of a nonstandard contextual parameter.  
Evidently, the meaning of indexical expressions cannot be compared with the meaning of, 
say, come and go. The meaning of verb phrases of this type are explicitly perspectival, while 
indexicals are perspectival only in the sense that they can be involved in sentences which are 
able to express perspectival propositions. 
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 At several points in his later works, Predelli argues that parameter shift is governed by 
speaker’s intentions. This is a more reasonable proposal, but it has its own obvious 
limitations. See, for example, Predelli 2002, 2005 and, for a critique, Stevens 2009. 
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 Kaplan 1989: 593. 
19
 Predelli 1997: 71. 
There arises immediately the question of why to posit an additional contextual parameter if 
nothing in the meaning rules of indexicals requires it. The most plausible answer is that 
though the perspectival element remains unarticulated linguistically, the effect it produces is 
directly accessible in an epistemically relevant sense for the consumers of fictions. Everyone 
who possesses the concept of fiction knows fairly well that fictional sentences cannot be 
treated as if they were factual utterances. 
Kaplanian contexts can be conservatively enriched with a nonstandard perspective 
parameter in the following simple way. In fictional discourses, a standard collection of 
parameters <a, t, l, w> takes the form of <a→af, t→tf, l→lf, w=wf >, where the subscript f  
denotes the perspective of the fiction F, and the symbol → represents an optional shift between 
a standard and a nonstandard parameter. w=wf  means that the world parameter of the context 
is obligatorily shifted to the world parameter of the fiction. There is no need here to opt for 
fully obligatory shift, because in fictional settings indexicals are allowed to change their 
contribution to sentential content independently from each other. A shifted agent parameter, 
for example, does not necessarily imply a shifted location or time parameter.  
Note that fictional perspective is conceived here as part of the content of indexical 
sentences. But, if sentence contents are already enriched with a perspectival element, then the 
system of LD requires no further revision: circumstances of evaluation can retain their 
standard <w, t> structure in LD. It follows that the truthfulness of fictional sentence contents 
must be evaluated with respect to our actual world. With this background set in place, let us 
return to our earlier examples: 
 
(4) I must be idle. 
 
Two shifts may be supposed to occur in parallel in (4): a→af and w=wf. The value of the 
shifted agent parameter af  is the fictional character Hamlet, and the value of the shifted world 
parameter wf is the fictional world of the play. Thus, enriched with the perspective of Hamlet, 
(4) expresses the proposition that Hamlet must be idle, which is obviously true when 
evaluated at our actual world. As I have already mentioned in an endnote, the proper 
ontological status of the object denoted by the fictional proper name Hamlet is of no 
particular importance for the formal system of LD. From the point of view of the semantics of 
interpreted languages, Hamlet belongs clearly to the category of objects whatever ontological 
status it may be said to possess. We can take it that this ontologically unspecified object is the 
one which occurs as constituent in the proposition that Hamlet must be idle. 
Our slightly modified version of LD seems to deliver an intuitively correct result also in 
the indexical-free case: 
 
(5) Denmark’s a prison. 
 
The world parameter of (5) can be considered as obligatorily shifted from w to wf. The 
proposition the sentence type expresses in the context of the performance of the play is then 
the perspectival proposition that Denmark’s a prison, which is true, again, at our actual world. 
As it has already been stated above, perspective cannot be thought of as a standard 
contextual parameter since it is not a built-in element in the meaning rules of indexicals. 
Neither can it be thought of as a particular kind of semantic object. It should instead be 
conceived as a content shift indicator: whenever consumers of fictions recognize its presence, 
they can come to know that an interpretive task must be performed in order to arrive at an 
empirically adequate evaluation of a certain set of sentences. Recognizing the presence of a 
shift indicator is, in one sense of the word, an extra-semantic task.
20
 One has to recognize by 
way of experience or inference that the standard contextual resources are unsatisfactory for 
understanding a given sentence. But the same requirement holds for any semantic system 
sufficiently similar to LD: formal systems also have to detect proper contextual determinants 
for the sentences they are applied to. I think that is the key point. If the content of indexical 
sentences in fictional discourse gets enriched and modified by perspectival parameters, then 
the system of LD should mirror this fact. We are then driven to the conclusion that what sets 
off the process of parameter-shifting within formal models of indexicality is the quest for 
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 The case of fictional perspective thus shows some resemblance with the case of irony. Irony 
can also not be recognized without mobilizing such extra-semantic skills as intention 
detection or implicature comprehension. 
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